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Abstract: This study intends to investigate empirically the long-run relationship between deposit and 
lending rates in Jordan by utilizing quarterly data over the period (1994-2010). Empiri-
cally, we search to identify the dominant interest rate; either deposit rate or lending rate. To 
achieve the current study goals, we employ the error correction model technique and the 
asymmetric short-run dynamic model. The empirical evidence of the Jordanian economy 
illustrates deposit and lending rates have a long-run relationship. Deposit rate leads lending 
rate. As a result, the short-run lending rate adjustment for the deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium by about 22 percent in the current period. In the long-run, lending rate adjusts 
by 90 percent for a change in deposit rate.
Keywords: Monetary policy, Retail interest rate, Symmetric adjustment, Interest rate pass-through, 
Error correction model.
JEL Classifi cation: E43
Introduction
Understanding monetary policy effectiveness is a fundamental topic of monetary 
economics. For this reason, large number of economists focused on exploring chan-
nels of monetary transmission on both empirical and theoretical levels (e.g., Bern-
anke & Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 1995; Clarida, Gali & Gertler, 1999; Ireland, 2005; 
Poddar, Sab, & Khachatryan; 2006 ). Through the investigation process the relation-
ship between policy short-term interest rate and banks’ retail interest rates i.e. deposit 
and lending rates has received modest consideration in monetary theory and empiri-
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cal studies. Meanwhile, fi rms’ and households’ behaviors are more related to retail 
interest rates rather than the policy short-term interest rate. Accordingly, monetary 
economists conduct a large number of studies based on data from single and group of 
countries to investigate the interest rate pass-through (e.g., Hofmann & Mizen, 2004; 
Liu, Margaritis & Tourani-Rad, 2008; Payne & Waters; 2008; Ozdemir, 2009; Swei-
dan, 2010). Technically, these studies examine the degree and speed of adjustment of 
retail interest rates for a change in policy interest rate.  
Within this framework of analysis, monetary and macro economists confi rm that 
many important economics variables display asymmetric adjustment and asymmet-
ric effect. For example1, Cover (1992) confi rmed that positive monetary policy shocks 
in the U.S. economy do not affect output. On the contrary, negative monetary policy 
shocks affect output. Other economists claim that retail bank interest rate is sticky, 
for example, de Bondt (2005) explored the interest rate pass-through process in the 
euro area. He concluded the immediate pass-through of market interest rates to retail 
bank interest rates is incomplete. 
In this paper, we work on a new link. We believe commercial banks have a cru-
cial role in the monetary transmission mechanism. Setting deposit and lending rates 
are vital for lenders and borrowers. We accept as true that exploring the long-run 
relationship between deposit and lending rates help to understand interest rate pass-
through in depth. Additionally, we highlight on the nature of the decisions made by 
the commercial banks’ whether it is affected by either their costs or their revenues.
Within the current literature review progress, we produce series of papers to un-
derstand monetary policy in Jordan2. Sweidan (2008) investigated whether Jordan’s 
policy interest rate adjusts differently to expansionary versus contractionary mone-
tary policies or not. He utilized threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum TAR 
(MTAR) models. His conclusion confi rms that Jordan’s policy interest rate exhibits 
symmetric adjustment. It means that the CBJ is not biased of either easy or tight mon-
etary policy. Sweidan (2009) studies the CBJ preferences. He fi nds the CBJ prefers 
high levels of infl ation rate and output. Recently, Sweidan (2011b) inspected empiri-
cally the relationship between short-term policy interest rate and both deposit and 
lending rates in Jordan. He explored the speed of adjustment and pass-through from 
policy rate to deposit and lending rates. He ended-up that Jordan’s deposit and lend-
ing interest rates follow a symmetric movement for their deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium. Besides, he found Jordan’s deposit rate adjusts larger and faster than 
lending rate for a deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Further, Sweidan (2011a) 
examined monetary policy inertia in the Jordanian economy. His results prove that 
monetary policy inertia is highly signifi cant in Jordan. Also, the evidence illustrates 
that both infl ation rate and output gap have insignifi cant effect on setting policy rate. 
Moreover, policy interest rate seems to be set gradually in reaction to monetary pol-
icy inertia, foreign interest rate and unobserved variable.  
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 Sweidan (2011b) did not study in-depth the direct relationship between deposit 
and lending rates in Jordan, we believe this is a missing signifi cant link because it 
focuses on the commercial banks’ behavior and even it confi rms the consistency of 
Sweidan (2011b) fi ndings. Their behavior in setting their deposit and lending rates 
signifi cantly affects monetary policy effectiveness. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review of the relationship between deposit 
and lending rates. Section 3 introduces deposit and lending rates in Jordan. Section 4 
introduces the method of the current study. Section 5 presents the empirical results. 
Conclusions are presented in the section 6.  
Literature Review
Literature shows few studies have explored the relationship between deposit and 
lending rates. The attention on this imperative relationship is essential to understand 
monetary policy effectiveness, particularly interest rate pass-through. This concept 
means how a change in a policy interest rate affects the commercial banks’ retail in-
terest rates; deposit and lending rates. Dueker (2000) checked whether an asymmetric 
relationship exists between lending rate and market interest rate or not. He found an 
asymmetric behavior; lending rate responds faster to positive shocks of market rate 
than negative shocks. Accordingly, he stated banks are unlikely to decrease their 
lending rates during a recession due to the higher risk of default. This risk-averse 
behavior of bankers may result in lending rate displaying asymmetric movements 
to a change in market rate. Thompson (2006) demonstrated that banks may set their 
prime lending rates as some mark-up or margin over their deposit rates. If the markup 
is perceived to be too high or too low, the market force will command banks to alter 
back to some normal equilibrium spread. This conclusion is supported by the fi nd-
ings of Ewing, Payne, and Forbes (1998) and Ewing and Kruse (2007). Both studies 
confi rmed that the spread returns back to its long-run equilibrium situation following 
a shock. With more details, the former confi rmed the existence a long-run cointe-
gration between lending rate and certifi cate of deposit rate. As a result, lending rate 
modifi es to eliminate any disequilibrium position. The latter concludes that the re-
lationship between prime-deposit rate spread is affected by economic growth, infl a-
tion rate and monetary policy. Technically, shocks to infl ation enlarge the spread. In 
contrast, unpredicted changes in the federal funds rate and economic growth narrow 
the spread.  Additionally, Thompson (2006) suggested a considerable idea which is 
banks may use this technique of asymmetric retail interest rate setting behavior even 
though it may not be optimal in the long-run. If banks have market power, they can 
expand of the spread by slowly adjusting their lending rates to the falling deposit 
rates. Nevertheless, other competing banks would simply alter their lending rates fi rst 
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to capture more customers and gain larger market share. On the international assess-
ment level, Chatrath et al. (1997) investigated the long-run relationship between bank 
lending and borrowing markets across six industrialized countries3. Their fi nding 
illustrated an increase of integration among banks lending and borrowing markets. 
It is a vital conclusion and consistent with the movement towards the globalization. 
Recently, Su and Chang (2010) employed the threshold error-correction model to ex-
amine the presence of a non-linear cointegration between lending and deposit rates of 
eight4 Eastern European countries. Their results proved the existence of asymmetric 
behavior. 
Deposit and Lending Rates in Jordan 
The economy of Jordan is categorized as lower middle-income with about 6.11 million 
inhabitants and annual per capita income at constant market prices equal to $2290 in 
2010. The Jordanian economy is part of the Middle East region which is identifi ed as 
unstable region. Hence, the economy is very sensitive to external shocks either political 
events or economic affairs i.e. higher international oil prices and lower external grants. 
Since late 1995, the dinar has been offi cially pegged to the Jordan the US$ at a fi xed 
exchange rate 1JD= $1.4104. That’s why, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) seeks to 
accumulate foreign reserves to help cushion against external shocks and preserve the 
fi xed exchange rate. The CBJ main goals are to enhance economic growth, retain price 
stability and protect the fi xed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. 
In September 1993, the CBJ utilized the indirect method i.e. certifi cate of deposit 
which is issued by itself to control the money supply. The new operating procedure 
has a vital impact on deposit and lending rates. The CBJ targets banks’ deposit and 
lending rates to guarantee a high demand on the Jordanian dinar relative to the U.S. 
dollar. Hence, the success of monetary policy to achieve its goals depends on how the 
certifi cate of deposit rate affects the bank’s retail interest rates. In March 1998, the 
CBJ used the overnight deposit facility (ODF) as a new tool to control the liquidity in 
the money market on a daily basis. The ODF interest rate is the fl oor of the inter-bank 
rate. Technically, the CBJ is operating between two boundaries; maintaining the at-
tractiveness of the Jordanian dinar versus maintaining a pegged exchange rate to the 
U.S dollar. Consequently, it is fundamental for the CBJ to be effective and have a 
symmetric control and effect on deposit and lending rates to keep their spread within 
a certain margin. For this reason, we expect to fi nd a long-run relationship between 
deposit and lending rates in Jordan.
Figure (1) shows the movement of deposit and lending rates in the Jordanian econ-
omy during the period (1994:1-2010:2). The average spread between the two interest 
rates is 4.31 basis points. The range of the spread is between 2.61 basis points in the 
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fi rst quarter of 1996 and 6.37 basis points in the second quarter of 2003. The range of 
deposit rate is 6.74. However, the range of lending rate is 5.36 basis points. Moreover, 
deposit rate reaches its maximum and minimum faster than lending rate over the data 
sample of the current study. This behavior proves that deposit rate is more fl exible 
than lending rate to economic events and policy actions. Sweidan (2011b) proved that 
deposit rate adjusts larger and faster than lending rate for a deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium. For this reason, Jordan’s monetary policy action needs roughly 11 quarters 
to be effective. He explained this behavior by two reasons: fi rst, the highly competitive 
banking sector environment in Jordan. Second, large share of the Jordanian banks are 
a family-business, as a result, they are watchful in conducting their family business. 
Thus, he believes this is a basic restriction on Jordan monetary policy effectiveness.
Jordan has a stable, privately owned and growing banking sector. Besides, it is 
well capitalized, liquid and profi table and opened to external investors. The number 
of operating banks in this sector is 23 divided among the following categories; 13 
local commercial banks, 8 foreign banks and 2 Islamic banks. The banking business 
environment in Jordan is vastly competitive. The latest data illustrates a remarkable 
deterioration in the market concentration. Nevertheless, the market share of the larg-
est three banks is around 40%.
                              
Figure 1: Jordan’s Deposit and Lending Rates
The Methodology
In order to explore the long-run relationship between lending and deposit rates in the 
Jordanian economy, we utilize an error-correction model (ECM) as a fi rst step in the 
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refl ect the immediate or short-run adjust-
ment parameters, λ is the speed of adjustment of lending rate for a departure from the 
prior equilibrium.  Empirically, we aim at estimating the parameters of the model. 
Moreover, we will utilize the variance decomposition which shows the relative power 
of each variable in the model to explain the remaining variables. 
The second empirical step of the current study is to examine if the lending rate 
adjusts asymmetrically to the movement of the error correction term (ect). To achieve 
this goal, we adopt the methodology of Scholnick (1996), Sander and Kleimeier 
(2000), Ozdemir (2009) and Sweidan (2011b) which is known as the asymmetric 
short-run dynamic model. This technique divides the error correction term into two 
components, as follows:  
ect ectt
+ = , if ect > mean(0) 
ect ectt
+ = = 0, otherwise
ect ectt
− = , if ect < mean(0) 
ect ectt
− = = 0, otherwise
Then, we estimate the asymmetric short-run dynamic model, which has the fol-
lowing form:
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Empirical Results
We use quarterly data from Jordan during the period (1994:1-2010:2). The data source 
is the CBJ monthly statistical bulletin. The model has two variables, which they are 
deposit rate and lending rate. The fi rst step in the empirical results is to explore whether 
the data on the level has a unit root or not. This is a fundamental step to avoid producing 
a spurious regression. Consequently, we perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit 
root test without trend and intercept7. Results are reported in Table (1). The lag length 
of ADF test is selected based on Schwartz Criterion. The two series have a unit root on 
the level. However, all of them are stationary at the fi rst difference. 
Table (1): Augmented Dickey -Fuller Unit Root Test
Variable Levels First Difference
Lag Length ADF test Lag Length ADF test
dr 1 -1.07 0 -3.61
lr 2 -0.61 1 -3.55
Note: The critical values are -2.60, -1.94 and -1.61 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The next step in the empirical results is to test if there is a bivariate cointegra-
tion relationship between lending rate and deposit rate. We use Johansen test and the 
results are reported in Table (2). The trace test statistics and maximum eigenvalue 
illustrate that there is one cointegration relation between lending and deposit rates 
at 5 percent and 1 percent signifi cant levels. The result confi rms the existence of a 
long-run relationship.
Table (2): Lending rate and deposit rate cointegration test
Trace Test Statistics
Null Alternative Statistic 5% Critical Value 1% Critical Value
r = 0





















The fi nal step in the empirical results is to estimate the error correction model 
(ECM). Let us examine the ECM8 results which are presented in Table (3). First con-
sider the lending rate regression. Lending rate adjusts signifi cantly for three factors; 
short-run movement of lagged lending rate, deviation from its long-run equilibrium and 
adjustments for deposit rate movements in the long-run. The short-run changes in the 
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lagged lending rate have a negative impact on changes in lending rate with a value equal 
to 32 percent and it is statistically signifi cant different from zero. A possible explana-
tion is that in the short-run banks are revising their lending rate downward because 
of the high competition in the market. The short-run adjustment speed of lending rate 
deviation from its long-run equilibrium is corrected roughly by 22 percent in the cur-
rent period. Also, this parameter has the right sign and statistically signifi cant different 
from zero. As a result, the mean adjustment lag9 of lending rate needs approximately 5 
quarters to approach its long-run equilibrium. In the long-run, lending rate adjustment 
coeffi cient is 90 percent and is statistically signifi cant different from zero. Accordingly, 
lending rate adjusts by 90 percent of a 1 percent change in deposit rate in the long run. 
This type of adjustment is incomplete because it is less than one.
The variance decomposition illustrates the relative importance of each variable in 
the model to explain the other variables. Table (4) shows the ability of deposit rate to 
explain the variation of lending rate over the time horizon. This evidence supports the 
idea that deposit rate is dominant and leads lending rate.
Table (3): The Results of the Error Correction Model











0.063 (0.53) 0.49 (3.58)***
Δdr
t-2
-0.066 (-0.51) 0.28 (1.85)*
Δlr
t-1
-0.32 (-2.80)*** 0.03 (0.22)
Δlr
t-2
-0.0014 (-0.11) 0.05 (-0.38)
ect
t-1
-0.22 (-4.79)*** 0.01 (0.23)
R
– 2 0.42 0.40
F-stat. 10.05 9.17
Notes: 
1) The ECM estimated using 2 lags based on lag length criterion; LR, FPE, AIC, SC and HQ. 
2) */**/***: denotes signifi cance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively.
3) T-statistics are in parenthesis.
Table (4): The Variance Decomposition of Lending Rate
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Second consider the deposit rate regression. Deposit rate responds signifi cantly 
only for two factors; its short-run and long-run lagged values. Since the error cor-
rection term of deposit rate model is statistically insignifi cant different from zero, 
deposit rate does not react to its departure from the long-run equilibrium. These are 
crucial fi ndings because it means deposit rate does not adjust for any diversion from 
the long-run equilibrium and any change in lending rate. These fi ndings prove that 
deposit rate leads lending rate. In the short-run deposit rate is affected positively by 
its fi rst and second lagged, the value of this infl uence is 49 percent and 28 percent, re-
spectively, and it is statistically signifi cant different from zero. This fi nding supports 
the above-mentioned behavior of the short-run bank lending rate. In the short-run, 
banks are revising their deposit rates upward because Jordan’s banking sector has a 
high competition level. 
The results of the asymmetric model are reported in Table (5). The results of the 
symmetric and asymmetric models are identical. The new information provided by 
the asymmetric model is the speed of adjustment when the lending rate is above and 
below their equilibrium levels are 25 percent and 19 percent, respectively, and statis-
tically different from zero. To investigate if lending rate adjusts symmetrically to the 





are equal or not. The Wald statistic is reported in Table (5), the symmetric 
adjustment hypothesis of lending rate cannot be rejected. Lending rate displays a 
symmetric adjustment to the error correction term movement.
In sum, the fi ndings of the current paper and the previous series of our papers 
tell a consistent story about Jordan’s retail interest rate movements. We think the 
best explanation of this behavior is the high competitiveness in Jordan’s banking 
sector. There is no doubt that any change in policy rate affects deposit rate faster 
and larger than lending rate. The fi rst priority of Jordan’s bank is to control their 
deposit rates (costs) for a change in policy rate. Then, the second concern is to 
adjust their lending rates (revenues) to guarantee certain level of profi ts. This proc-
ess of adjustment is slow and needs approximately 5 quarters for lending rate to 
reach to its long-run equilibrium for a change in deposit rate. Moreover, Sweidan 
(2011b) fi nds that it requires lending rate around 11 quarters to accomplish its long-
run equilibrium for a change in policy rate. The gap is the mean adjustment lag of 
deposit rate to attain its long-run equilibrium for a change in policy rate, which 
is around 6 quarters as proved by Sweidan (2011b). The policy implication of the 
above-mentioned fi ndings is that the slow speed of adjustment makes the monetary 
policy effectiveness slow too.
46 Osama D. Sweidan
Table (5): The Results of the Asymmetric Model: Lending Rate
Variables Δlr
t


























1) */**/***: denotes signifi cance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively.
2) T-statistics are in parenthesis.
Conclusions
Monetary policy effectiveness depends largely on the degree and speed of retail in-
terest rates modifi cation to a change in policy interest rate. This adjustment channel 
polarized more attention of monetary economists over the last two decades. What is 
more, we claim that commercial banks have a signifi cant role in this process by set-
ting their retail interest rate. Hence, the current paper provides evidence from a devel-
oping country about the role of commercial banks in the interest rate pass-through. 
Put it in a different way, we study the long-run relationship between deposit rate and 
lending rate in a developing country.
One of the big economic challenges in developing countries, particularly the Middle 
Eastern countries, is to explore the relationships among the macroeconomic variables, 
specifi cally, those macroeconomic variables related to the policy reaction. Filling this 
gap helps us to understand our economies and to take better economic decisions. Thus, 
we work on a continuous series of papers to understand monetary policy in Jordan, 
which lacks such vital studies. In our previous two published papers, we inspected 
whether the Jordan policy interest rate adjusts differently to expansionary versus con-
tractionary monetary policies. Besides, we examined the relationship between short-
term policy interest rate and both deposit and lending rates in Jordan. The current paper 
intends to check the long-run relationship between deposit and lending rates in Jordan 
by using a quarterly data over the period (1994-2010). Therefore, the current paper con-
tributes to the existing empirical body of Jordan’s monetary policy.
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We can summarize the fi ndings of the current paper as follows: First, Jordan’s 
deposit and lending rates have a long-run relationship. Second, Deposit rate is domi-
nant and leads lending rate. Third, the short-run lending rate adjustment speed for the 
divergence from the long-run equilibrium is about 22 percent in the current period. 
Consequently, the mean adjustment lag of lending to reach to its long-run equilibrium 
is approximately 5 quarters. Fourth, in the long-run, lending rate has an incomplete 
adjustment for a change in deposit rate. The empirical fi ndings of the current paper 
and the previous series of our papers has a policy implication, which is the slow speed 
of adjustment among policy interest rate, deposit interest rate and lending rate makes 
Jordan’s monetary policy effectiveness slow too.
NOTES
1 For additional reading see Sichel (1993).
2 Poddar, Sab and Khachatryan (2006) studied monetary policy transmission in Jordan.
3 These countries are USA, Canada, Japan, France, Germany and the UK.
4 These countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine.
5 This is the fi nal order of the variables which relies on several evidences; fi ndings of Sweidan (2011b), 








-c), Where γ reveals the long-run adjustment.
7 We followed Enders (1995) methodology, for more details see Enders (1995) pages 221-224.
8 We run two residual tests of autocorrelation and both of them reject the hypothesis of autocorrela-
tion.
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